, Probab. Statist. Group Manchester (24 pp) We present solutions to nonzero-sum optimal stopping games for Brownian motion in [0, 1] absorbed at either 0 or 1 . The approach used is based on the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions derived in [1]. In this setting this characterisation of the value functions has a transparent geometrical interpretation of 'pulling two ropes' above 'two obstacles' which must however be constrained to pass through certain regions. This is an extension of the analogous result derived by Peskir in [16] and [17] (semiharmonic characterisation) for the value function in zero-sum games of optimal stopping. To derive the value functions we transform the game into a free-boundary problem. The latter is then solved by making use of the double smooth-fit principle which was also observed in [1]. Martingale arguments based on Itô-Tanaka formula will then be used to verify that the solution to the free-boundary problem coincide with the value functions of the game and this will establish Nash equilibrium.
Introduction
The purpose of this work is to derive Nash equilibrium in two-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping for Brownian motion in [0, 1] , absorbed at either 0 and 1 . For this we shall use the results obtained in [1] , in particular the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions of the two players and the principle of double smooth fit. This probabilistic approach for studying the value functions and corresponding Nash equilibrium is in line with the results derived by Peskir in [16] and [17] for zero-sum games. In the case of absorbed Brownian motion in [0,1] the results of Peskir show that the value function in zero-sum games is equivalent to 'pulling a rope' between 'two obstacles' (semiharmonic characterisation) which in turn establishes Nash equilibrium (by 'pulling a rope' between 'two obstacles' we mean finding the shortest path between the graphs of two functions). In nonzero-sum games, under certain assumptions on the payoff functions, we will show that the value functions are equivalent to 'pulling two ropes' above 'two obstacles' which must however be constrained to pass through certain regions. As in the case of zero-sum games this geometric explanation of the value function will establish Nash equilibrium.
Literature on nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping are mainly concerned with existence of Nash equilibrium. Initial studies in discrete time date back to Morimoto [12] wherein a fixed point theorem for monotone mappings is used to derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium point. Ohtsubo [14] derived equilibrium values via backward induction and in [15] the same author considers nonzero-sum games with the smaller gain processes having a monotone structure and gives sufficient conditions for a Nash equilibrium point to exist. Shmaya and Solan in [20] proved that every two player nonzero-sum game in discrete time admits an ε -equilibrium in randomised stopping times. In continuous time Bensoussan and Friedman [3] showed that, for diffusions, Nash equilibrium exists if there exists a solution to a system of quasi-variational inequalities. However, the regularity and uniqueness of the solution remain open problems. Nagai [13] studies a nonzero-sum stopping game of symmetric Markov processes. A system of quasi-variational inequalities is introduced in terms of Dirichlet forms and the existence of extremal solutions of a system of quasi-variational inequalities is discussed. Nash equilibrium is then established from these extremal solutions. Cattiaux and Lepeltier [4] study right processes and they prove existence of a quasi-Markov Nash Equilbrium point. The authors follow Nagai's idea but use probabilistic tools rather than the theory of Dirichlet forms. Moreover they complete Nagai's result (whose construction of the extremal solutions of the quasi-variational inequalities is not complete) and extend it to non-symmetric processes. Huang and Li in [10] prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium point for a class of nonzero-sum noncyclic stopping games using the martingale approach. Laraki and Solan [11] proved that every two-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time admits an ε− equilibrium in randomised stopping times whereas Hamadène and Zhang in [9] prove existence of Nash equilibrium points using the martingale approach, for processes with positive jumps.
The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the game and review the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions and the double smooth fit principle (cf. [1]), when the underlying process is assumed to be absorbed Brownian motion in [0, 1] . In Section 3 we formulate and solve an equivalent free-boundary problem for a certain class of payoff functions. Under additional assumptions on the payoff functions we then show that the solution is also unique. In Section 4 we use martingale arguments based on Itô-Tanaka formula to verify that the solution to the free-boundary problem coincides with the value functions of the game. In Section 5 we provide a counterexample to show that if the origional assumptions imposed on the payoff functions are relaxed then Nash equilibrium may not be established via the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions. In Section 6 we explain how these results can be extended to one-dimensional regular diffusions and in Section 7 we conclude by giving some remarks for future research.
Double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions
Let X be Brownian motion in [0, 1] , started at x ∈ [0, 1] and absorbed at either 0 or 1 and let G i , H i : [0, 1] → R for i = 1, 2 be C 2 functions such that G i ≤ H i . Assume also that G i (0) = H i (0) and G i (1) = H i (1) . Consider the nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping in which player one wants to choose a stopping time τ * and player two a stopping time σ * such that their total average gains, which are respectively given by
are maximized. For a given strategy σ chosen by player two, we shall define the value function of player one by
Similarly, for a given strategy τ chosen by player one, we shall define the value function of player two by
In this context a saddle point of stopping times is characterized via Nash equilibrium. Formally, a pair of stopping times (τ * , σ * ) is a saddle point if
x (τ * , σ * ) for all stopping times τ and σ and for all x ∈ [0, 1] .
Under the mentioned assumptions on G i and H i , for i = 1, 2 , the result on the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions of player one and player two with the underlying process X introduced above become applicable (cf.
[1]). It is well known that superharmonic/subharmonic functions of X are equivalent to concave/convex functions and that continuity in the fine topology is equivalent to continuity in the familiar Euclidean topology. Thus in this setting, the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions can be explained rigorously as finding two continuous functions u and v such that
where Sup 
where τ * = inf{t ≥ 0 :
We initiate this study by showing that if D 1 is of the form [m, n] ∪ {0, 1} and D 2 of the form [r, l] ∪ {0, 1} for some points 0 ≤ m ≤ n ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ r ≤ l ≤ 1 then the functions u and v are contained in the sets Sup 1 v (G 1 , K 1 ) and Sup 2 u (G 2 , K 2 ) respectively. We will prove this claim for u as the result for v follows by symmetry. Clearly we have that u(x) = H 1 (x) for all x ∈ D 2 and that u is bounded above by K 1 . By definition of the infimum we also have that u(x) ≥ G 1 (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] . Since the infimum of concave functions is concave it follows that u is concave in D To prove this we shall follow the line of thought of Ekström and Villeneuve in [7] . Without loss of generality we prove that u is lower semi-continuous at l . Upper semi-continuity of u holds from the fact that u is the infimum of continuous fuctions. So suppose for contradiction that u is not right-lower-semicontinuous at l (note that u is left continuous at l by continuity of H 1 ). This means that there existsε > 0 such that lim x↓l u(x) < u(l) −ε . For given δ > 0 , let L be the line segment joining the points (l, u(l) −ε) and (l + δ, u(l + δ)) . By continuity of L it follows that there exists y ∈ (l, l + δ) such that L(y) > u(y) . By definition of u this means that there exists F ∈ Sup
Since F is continuous in [0, 1] and concave in (l, l + δ) we have that
This implies that F (l) < u(l) −ε , which contradicts the fact that F ≥ u . Thus u is rightlower-semi-continuous at l .
Free-boundary problem
In this section we shall formulate a free-boundary problem by making use of the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions. For this we will assume that there exist thresholds a, b with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 , such that
In this setting the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions can be explained geometrically as follows: Suppose that two ropes are pulled above two obstacles G 1 and G 2 with their endpoints pulled to the ground. Let D . All points of contact are then altered until both ropes touch their respective obstacles smoothly (it may also happen that the new regions coincide with the boundary points 0 and 1 in which case smoothness will break down). However, this must be done in such a way that the point of contact of the first rope with its obstacle G 1 must coincide with the point of contact of the second rope with H 2 and vice versa. With this intuitive explanation, we will search for a saddle point (τ * , σ * ) of optimal stopping times of the form
where 0 ≤ A * < B * ≤ 1 are optimal stopping boundaries that need to be determined and ρ 0,1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ∈ {0, 1}} . Prior to formulating the free-boundary problem we note that if there exists such optimal stopping boundaries then we must have that A * ≤ a and B * ≥ b . This is a consequence of the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions (which requires the value function of player one to be concave in (0, B * ) and that of player two to be concave in (A * , 1) ).
We are now in a position to formulate the free-boundary problem for unknown points 0 ≤ A * ≤ a < b ≤ B * ≤ 1 and unknown functions u, v : [0, 1] → R :
By means of straightforward calculations one can show that the solution of system (3.9)-(3.11) takes the form
for all x ∈ (A * , B * ) . In certain cases (which shall be specified below) the double smooth fit principle (cf. [1]) will also be satisfied, that is
If (3.16)-(3.17) and (3.18) hold we get that the optimal boundary points A * and B * must solve the system of non-linear equations We next study existence of points 0 ≤ A * < a < b < B * ≤ 1 , and corresponding functions u and v which solve the free-boundary problem (3.9)-(3.15). For the functions u and v to coincide with the value functions of the game (as shall be seen in the verification theorem in Section 4) we further need to study solutions to the system of equations (3.19)- (3.20) . For the latter we shall make use of the following result from convex analysis. The proof of this result can be found in [2] . Proposition 3.1 Let U be a non-empty convex subset of R n and f : U → R a differentiable stictly convex (resp. strictly concave) function. Then
for eachx ∈ int(U) and for all x ∈ U with x =x , where ∇f (x) is the vector of partial derivatives of f atx .
We will also need the following preliminary result. i. We only prove that Θ(A, B) < 0 for all A ∈ [a, 1] as for Γ the result follows by symmetry. Consider first the case when A ∈ (a, 1) . Since G ′′ 1 is strictly convex in (a, 1] we see from Proposition 3.1 that
for A = B , where the first inequality follows from the fact that G 1 ≤ H 1 . Now suppose that A = a . From (3.22) we have that Θ(a + ε, B) < 0 for any ε > 0 sufficiently small. Since Θ is continuous on [0, 1] × [0, 1] and the mapping A → Θ(A, B) is increasing in (a, a + ε) it follows that Θ(a, B) < 0 . When A = 1 we get, from Taylor's theorem with the mean value form of the remainder, that
. From this we can deduce, in a similar way to (3.22) , that Θ(1, B) < 0 and this proves the required result.
ii. This follows from the fact that for each B ∈ We are now in a position to determine the points A * and B * in the free-boundary problem (3.9)-(3.15) by studying the system of equations (3.19) - (3.20) . For this we shall consider only the case when there exists a unique (cf. 
. Again from Lemma 3.2 we have the existence of a unique continuously differentiable function ψ :
ii. Suppose that there exists at least one A 
) and hence we conclude that there exists (
It remains to consider the case B 
Uniqueness of solution to the free-boundary problem
Having proved that there exists a solution to the free-boundary problem we now consider some special cases in which the solution to the system of equations 
Then the solution to (3.19)-(3.20) is unique.
Proof. We shall only prove (i.) as for (ii.) the result follows analogously. Prior to proving Proposition 3.4 we need the following simple fact from convex analysis. Proof. We first show that f (B) < g(B) for any B ∈ (A, m) . For this consider the lines L 1 (x) joining the points (A, g(A)) and (m, g(m)) and L 2 (x) joining the points (A, f (A)) and (m, f (m)) . By concavity of g and convexity of f we get that g(B) ≥ L 1 (B) > L 2 (B) ≥ f (B) . We next show that f (B) > g(B) for any B ∈ [l, A) . For this we note, by convexity of f and concavity of g (recall Proposition 3.1), that
Proposition 3.4 Suppose that H
Again by convexity of f , concavity of g and Proposition 3.1, we have that
for all B ∈ [l, A) , where the last inequality follows from (3.27).
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Since the functions φ and ψ are continuously differentiable we can take the partial derivatives on both sides of the equations Θ(φ(B), B) = 0 and Γ(A, ψ(A)) = 0 and rearranging terms to get
The inequalities follow from the concavity properties of G 1 and G 2 and from the fact that G
. From this we conclude that φ and ψ are decreasing on A Γ and A Θ respectively. Take any B 1 , B 2 ∈ A Γ such that B 1 < B 2 . From the monotonicity property of φ together with the facts that G ′′ 1 < 0 and is monotonic increasing on A Θ , and that B 1 − φ(B 1 ) < B 2 − φ(B 2 ) we have that
Using again the concavity property of G 1 on A Θ and that of H 1 on A Γ we get that
where the last inequality follows by recalling that G ′ 1 (A) < H ′ 1 (B) for all (A, B) ∈ A Θ × A Γ . Combining (3.30) and (3.31) we see that
from which the strict convexity property of φ on A Γ follows. Analogously, one can show that ψ is strictly concave on A Γ . Since φ is continuously differentiable and φ ′ < 0 in [b, 1] , it follows that the inverse function φ −1 : A Θ → [b, 1] is a decreasing continuously differentiable funtion. Moreover, using the fact that the inverse of convex decreasing functions is also convex we deduce that φ −1 is convex on A Θ . Since A Θ is a closed interval, we can use Lemma 3.5 to deduce that the functions φ −1 and ψ intersect only once on A Θ and so we can conclude that there exists only one point (A * , B * ) ∈ A Θ × A Γ which solve the system of equations (3.19)-(3.20). H i (1) . If G 1 , G 2 satisfy assumptions (3.1)-(3.6) then the functions
Verification theorem
where u * (x; A * , B * ) takes the form (3.16) and v * (x; A * , B * ) is given by (3.17), coincide with the value functions V ′ (which exists a.e.) is of bounded variation. But this implies that u can be written as the difference of two convex functions. So we can apply Itô-Tanaka formula (cf. [21] ) to u(X t ) to get that
where (l B * t ) t≥0 is the local time of X at the point B * , defined by l B * t = P x − lim 1 ε t 0 I(B * < X s < B * +ε)ds and (M t ) t≥0 is a local martingale, given by t 0 u ′ − (X s )dX s . The third equality follows from the occupation time space formula (cf. [8] ) together with the definition of u and the fact that u is smooth at A * . The last equality follows again from the definition of u . Since σ * = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≥ B * } ∧ ρ 0,1 we have that 
for every stopping time τ of X . Taking the P x -expectation we conclude, by the optional sampling theorem, that
for all stopping times τ . Letting n → ∞ we conclude by Fatou's lemma that
for all τ . Taking the supremum over all τ it follows that V 1 σ * (x) ≤ u(x) . It remains to prove that (4.7) holds with equality if τ is replaced by τ * . Indeed, from (4.3) and the structure of the stopping times τ * and σ * we get that (4.8) u(X τ * ∧τn∧σ * ) = u(x) + M τ * ∧τn∧σ * .
Taking the P x -expectation on both sides of (4.8) and the limit as n → ∞ we have, by Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem, that
x (τ * , σ * ) and so equality of V 1 σ * and u follows. By symmetry one can also show that V 2 τ * (x) = v(x) . We next provide three results to link the solution of the free-boundary problem with the value functions of the game in the case when A * and B * do not solve the system of equations (3.19)-(3.20) . The proofs can be carried out using similar arguments to the proof of Theorem 4.1 and therefore shall be ommitted. u
where u * (x; A * , 1) takes the form (3.16) and v * (x; A * , 1) is given by (3.17) , with B * = 1 and A * being the solution of the nonlinear equation (3.19) . If Γ(A *
respectively, where τ * = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≤ A * } ∧ ρ 0,1 and σ * = ρ 0,1 .
Proposition 4.3
Consider the assumptions given in Theorem 4.1. Let
where u * (x; 0, B * ) takes the form (3.16) and v * (x; 0, B * ) is given by (3.17) with A * = 0 and B * being the solution of the nonlinear equation (3.20) . If Θ(0, B * ) < 0 then u and v coincide with the value functions
x (τ * , σ) respectively, where τ * = ρ 0,1 and σ * = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≥ B} ∧ ρ 0,1 . 
Counterexample
In this section we shall give a counterexample to show that if assumptions (3.1)-(3.6) are relaxed then the functions u and v may not exist. For this consider the payoff functions G i and H i given in figure 1 . Suppose that the pair (τ * , σ * ) is a Nash equilibrium point so that
. From the theory of optimal stopping (cf. [18] ) it is known that
Again from the theory of optimal stopping we know that V 1 coincides with the smallest concave function majorizing G 1 (which is known to be continuous by the continuity of G 1 ). Since H 1 is concave and H 1 ≥ G 1 we have that
where θ is the shift operator (cf. [18, Chapter II] ). The second equality follows from the fact that V 1 (X τ D 1 ) = G 1 (X τ D 1 ) (since both V 1 and G 1 are continuous). The fourth and last equalities follows from the fact that
The fifth equality follows from the strong Markov property of X whereas the seventh equality follows from the fact that
To prove the required result we let τD 1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ∈D 1 } whereD 1 = {V 1 σ * = G 1 } (since we are assuming that V 1 σ * is continuous we must have thatD 1 is closed). From (5.1) and the Markov property of X we have
For this we used the fact that τ * • θ τ * = 0 . From (5.4) and by definition of τD 1 (upon recalling thatD 1 is closed) it follows that τ * ≥ τD 1 P x -a.s. Finally, since V 1 σ * (x) ≥ V 1 (x) (cf. (5.3) ) we see thatD 1 ⊆ D 1 and so τD 1 ≥ τ D 1 P x -a.s. from which the result follows.
(2 • ) . We show that the pair (ρ 0,1 , σ * ) , with ρ 0,1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ∈ {0, 1}} , cannot be a Nash equilibrium point. So suppose for contradiction that (ρ 0,1 , σ * ) is a Nash equilibrium point. Consider first the optimal stopping problem V 2 (x) = sup σ E x G 2 (X σ ) and let σ D 2 = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ∈ D 2 } where D 2 = {V 2 = G 2 } . From the theory of optimal stopping we know that V 2 is the smallest concave function majorizing G 2 and σ D 2 is an optimal stopping time (as for V 1 one can show that V 2 is continous by continuity of G 2 ). We first show that if
for any stopping time σ , in particular for σ * we have that
Taking the supremum over all σ we get that
Note that the penultimate inequality follows from the fact that V 2 (0) = G 2 (0) and V 2 (1) = G 2 (1) and so D 2 ⊇ {0, 1} . On the other hand
(x) by definition of V 2 and so we conclude that E x G 2 (X σ * ∧ρ 0,1 ) = V 2 (x) . From this it follows that σ * ∧ ρ 0,1 is an optimal stopping time for problem V 2 (x) = sup σ E x G 2 (X σ ) . Moreover, by the Markov property of X we have that
and so, by continuity of V 2 and G 2 we get that σ * ∧ ρ 0,1 ≥ σ D 2 P x -a.s. for each x ∈ [0, 1] . From this, together with the fact that H 1 is concave (that is superharmonic relative to X ), it follows that
Now if (ρ 0,1 , σ * ) were to be a Nash equilibrium point then we must have that M figure 3 and consider the optimal stopping problem V
F is continuous, F = H 2 inD 1 , F is concave inD c 1 } whereD 1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ∈ {0, A 2 , 1}} . Moreover, the first entry time σD
= G 2 } is an optimal stopping time. Now consider the optimal stopping problem V
Moreover, the first entry time σD together with the mappings
The sets D 1 , 
Regular Diffusions
We shall now link nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping for one-dimensional regular diffusions with nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping for Brownian motion. In doing so one can then use the results in the previous sections to show that for a certain class of payoff functions, nonzero-sum optimal stopping games for one-dimensional regular diffusions admit a Nash equilibrium point. So let X be a one-dimensional regular diffusion in [0, 1] , absorbed at either 0 or 1 and suppose that α ≥ 0 is a given constant. Let us assume that the fine topology coincides with the Euclidean topology and let L X be the infinitesimal generator of X . It is well known that under regularity conditions (cf. example [18] 
+ µ(x)F x for x ∈ (0, 1) where µ(x) ∈ R is the drift and σ 2 (x) is the diffusion coefficient of X . Moreover, the second order L X F = αF admits two linearly independent solutions ψ and ϕ such that ψ(0), ϕ(1) > 0 and that ψ is increasing and ϕ is decreasing. These solutions are uniquely determined up to a multiplicative constant. In the case when α = 0 we can take ψ = S and ϕ ≡ 1 where S is the scale function of X .
(1 • ). Consider the nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping in which player one chooses a stopping time τ * and player two a stopping time σ * in order to maximize their expected payoffs, which are respectively given by
. For a given stopping time σ chosen by player two, let
be the value function of player one and for a given stopping time τ chosen by player one let
be the value function of player two. Suppose that there exist continuous functions u, v :
with K i , for i = 1, 2 , being the smallest α− superharmonic function (relative to X ) majorizing
for all stopping times τ of X and all x ∈ [0, 1] ). From the double partial superharmonic characterisation of the value functions we have that . From this it follows that the collections of functions in (6.6)-(6.7) are equivalent to
where K i , for i = 1, 2 , is the smallest function majorizing H i such that
We show that the sets in (6.9)-(6.10) are equivalent to collections involving ordinary concave functions. For this let B be a Brownian motion in [I(0), I(1)] , absorbed at either I(0) or I(1) and consider the nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping in which player one chooses a stopping time γ * and player two a stopping time β * in order to maximize their expected payoffs, which are respectively given by 
Concluding Remarks
We conclude this study by pointing out some remarks and directions for future research.
1. In general, given only assumptions (3.1) -(3.6) , there may exist stopping boundaries 0 ≤ B * ≤ A * ≤ 1 such that the first entry times τ * = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≤ A * } ∧ ρ 0,1 and σ * = inf{t ≥ 0 : X t ≥ B * } ∧ ρ 0,1 form a Nash equilibrium point. This may happen whenever there exists y ∈ (0, 1) such that G i (y) = H i (y) , where i = 1, 2 . Consider for example the 4. Another interesting problem would be to analyse the case when G 1 is not necessarily convex in (a, 1] and similarly when G 2 is not necessarily convex in [0, b) while retaining assumptions (3.1) and (3.6).
